Pearl Meyer



Applying Method to the Madness: Tools for Managing 2020 Payouts and Setting 2021 Target Compensation

A Compensation Committee Series Webinar Presented by NACD and Pearl Meyer

December 10, 2020

Meet the Presenters





Richard Schapiro has 35 years of investment banking experience as a trusted advisor in the health care and financial services sectors, principally at Salomon Brothers and Bank of America Merrill Lynch (retired 2014). He currently serves as an independent director on the boards of Molina Healthcare and Transamerica, chairing the compensation committee and serving as a member of the audit committee for both organizations. In addition, he serves on the finance committee of Molina Healthcare. Schapiro is an NACD Board Leadership Fellow and has received the CERT Certificate in Cybersecurity Oversight. Schapiro was named to the NACD Directorship 100 in 2018.



Jannice Koors is a senior managing director with Pearl Meyer and president of the firm's Western region. She has more than 25 years of experience in executive compensation and governance, and has consulted to companies of all sizes and industries. She advises company boards and management teams on all aspects of executive and director compensation design, performance measure selection and calibration, and related corporate governance issues. Jan is an NACD Governance Fellow, serves as faculty for the NACD's Director Professionalism and Master Class programs, and was recently named again to the NACD D100 list of the most influential people in corporate governance.



Jane Park, a principal in the New York office at Pearl Meyer, has more than 15 years' experience advising clients on executive pay and non-employee director compensation. Her work is focused on incentive plan design, pay-for-performance alignment, compensation benchmarking, proxy analysis, pay governance. She has deep experience working with companies on special programs for IPO and M&A transactions and works across multiple ownership models and industries, including oil & gas and chemicals. Jane is a frequent speaker on executive compensation and leadership development issues for the NACD and WCD.



- Submit a question and receive your answer directly from Pearl Meyer, either during today's webinar or as a follow-up. You will also be optedin to receive future executive compensation thought leadership from Pearl Meyer.
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- Presentation slides are available today at <u>www.pearlmeyer.com/applying-method-to-the-madness</u>
- The replay will be available early next week at <u>www.nacdonline.org/webinars</u> and <u>www.pearlmeyer.com/applying-</u> <u>method-to-the-madness</u>



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Agenda



- A Lot Has Changed Since March
- Balancing All Stakeholders is Critical
- Consider Holistic Approach 2020 and 2021 Compensation
- Early Compensation Disclosures
- Analytics to Inform Discretion and Plan Design
- ISS and Glass Lewis Considerations
- Case Studies

A Lot Has Changed Since March




• In April, we noted that a company's approach to compensation would vary based on the degree of impact from the pandemic.

Severely Negatively	Moderately Negatively	Positively
Impacted	Impacted	Impacted

- Some companies with initial negative impacts had better-than-expected second and/or third quarters.
 - Were some too quick to respond at the beginning of the pandemic?
- 2020 incentive plan payouts continue to be evaluated
- We are advising a holistic assessment of 2020 and 2021 compensation actions and today, we have more information to go on than in in March:
 - Market practices from non-calendar year filers
 - A better sense for how the proxy advisory firms will react

Balance is Key: Constituents and Other Factors





Consider a Holistic Approach to Assess Comp Plans



	2020	2021
	Focus is on incentive plans and whether discretion will be used	Focus is on goal-setting and whether there is enough visibility to establish new one- and three-year targets and retention through new equity awards
Base	Restore, if reduced	Merit?
STI	Assess Payouts for Fairness • What is the projected payout? (including and excluding COVID) • Was a new 2 nd half plan established? • Consider discretion or "let it lie"? • If discretion, what criteria should be considered? • Should use of discretion vary by participant level?	<u>Visibility to Establish New Target / Increase Likelihood of Some</u> <u>Payout</u> • Performance period (annual, semi-annual, quarterly) • Revisit financial measures/weights • Increase non-financial measures / ESG • Leverage curve (threshold to max) • Delay goal-setting • Cancel STI in favor of more equity
LTI	Assess Payouts for Fairness / Retention • What is projected PSUs payout for all open cycles? • Consider discretion or "let it lie"? • What is current value of other (time-vesting) equity? • Retention Grants? • Check retirement vesting	PSUs: Visibility to Establish New Target / Increase Likelihood of Payout Performance period (1, 2 or 3 years?) Revisit financial measures/weights Consider relative measures Leverage curve (threshold to max) Delay goal-setting Eliminate PSUs for 2021 only <u>Retention / Other</u> Change LTI mix: More RSUs/options Increase LTI value modestly Use cash if burn rate is an issue No grant if retention grant in 2020

Examples of Holistic Decision-Making



	2020	2021
Brinker	Base Salary: Temporary reduction Bonus: Exclude impact of COVID; negative discretion to reduce payouts to 91%	 Bonus and PSUs: Quarterly performance measurement LTI Mix: 80% RSUs / 20% PSUs 2020 Mix: 50% PSUs / 25% options / 25% RSUs Expect to resume "normal" LTI mix in 2022
Darden	Base Salary: Temporary reduction Bonus: Exclude impact of COVID; 94% payout	 Merit: None Bonus: Measure 2nd half financials (goals TBD); non-financial measures for 1st half will be a modifier on financials Same target bonus payout as 2020 LTI: Same value as 2020
Estee Lauder	Base Salary: Temporary reduction Bonus: No discretion (22-65% payouts) PSUs: No discretion (109.9% payout)	 Bonus: Increased max payout (150% to 165%) and introduced a 50% floor payout; eliminated ROIC as a measure LTI: Higher grant value; incremental value based on what the 2020 bonus would have paid assuming a 40% BU floor and 90% corporate floor Increased max payout (150% to 175%) and eliminated ROIC
FedEx	Base Salary: Temporary reduction Bonus / PSUs: No discretion (no payout)	Bonus: No plan Retention Grants: FMV options for CEO; RSUs for others (4-year vest) PSUs: New measures emphasize capital efficiency and capital deployment – EPS and CapEx to Revenue

Polling Question #1



Q1: Do you expect to exercise discretion in the STI plan?

- o Positive discretion
- o Negative discretion
- o No

Polling Question #2:



Q2: Do you expect to exercise discretion on PSUs on any or all cycles?


- 0 2018-20
- 0 2019-21
- 0 2020-22
- 0 **No**





We found a precedent for nearly all actions but no prevalent market trend.

Each company and industry will respond based on their own facts and circumstances. *Majority of the early disclosure companies are in the severely negatively impacted sectors (consumer discretionary and industrials)*



2021 Compensation Actions							
STI Plans			LTI Plans				
5% Cancelled STI	8% Delayed Goal- Setting	9% Include Non-Fin'l Measure	5% >50% Mix in RSUs	2% No Grant	2% PSUs w/ <3 yr perf	8% PSUs only measure rTSR	5% Delayed PSUs Grant

Questions for Management and the Consultant



How are the incentive plans tracking, to date?

- Can we exclude the impact of the pandemic?
- If 3rd and 4th quarters are stronger than expected, what if we only exclude 1st and 2nd quarters of 2020?
- No need for "one-size-fits-all" approach; consider tailoring adjustments by level (rank and file vs. NEOs).

Track other performance factors

• Financial and non-financial

Tally sheets: What is the actual impact on retention?

- One-page document, by individual, summarizing last 3-5 years of target compensation, realized compensation and current value of equity awards (YTD performance for PSUs, in-themoney value of options, current value of RSUs)
- Check retirement/other termination vesting provisions. Are individuals better off retiring because PSUs are tracking at zero and retirement provides target vesting?

Pay vs. performance analysis: Would compensation actions/payouts be aligned with performance?

Model/test proposed incentive plan payouts

Other External Considerations



ISS/GL have indicated they will be more favorably disposed to STI adjustments and less so toward adjustments to multi-year long-term incentives but will review on a case-by-case basis.

Recently, ISS published COVID-19 FAQs to address how they may view various pay actions related to COVID-19; key takeaways for incentive adjustments include:

Key Annual and Long-Term (LTI) Incentive Themes

Disclose rationale for changes/awards and why the approach was chosen instead of other choices

• Boilerplate language on "retention concerns" or "strong leadership during challenging times" is not sufficient

Explain how actions taken will further investors' interests

- Discuss what the original payout would have been and how final payouts align with performance, especially if goals were lowered without lowering payout opportunities
- Above-target payouts under changed programs will be closely scrutinized

Changes to LTI performance cycles will generally be viewed negatively

- Includes changes to in-progress 2018-20 and 2019-21 cycles; and
- More drastic changes to the 2020-22 cycle, e.g., shift to time-vesting or shorter periods

One-time, discretionary awards should be performance-based, with guardrails to avoid windfalls

Likely "Third Rail" Actions

- Modify all outstanding PSUs now
- Positive discretion on STI resulting in max payout (or above target payout) without sufficient explanation
- Lowering performance goals, without decreasing payout opportunities
- Other unexplained discretionary bonuses
- Stock option repricing
- Reducing PSUs in the 2021 CEO LTI mix to <50%

Case Study #1 – Consumer Goods



Fiscal Year	STI	LTI	ISS	Glass	SOP Vote
	Discretion	Discretion	Vote	Lewis Vote	Outcome
March 31	Yes	Yes	For	Against	90%

Proxy Filed June 2020

Annual Incentive Program	The committee used discretion to set the 2020 STI funding at 90% of target, reflecting on (1) above-target performance in the first nine months of the year; and (2) the estimated financial impact of COVID-19 on the last three months of the year.
Long-Term Incentive Program	The committee again used discretion for the 2018-20 LTI cycle to establish fiscal 2020 performance at 90% of target (same as with annual incentive) and then averaged 2020 with actual results for 2019 (200%) and 2018 (142%), resulting in a 144% of target attainment for the fiscal 2018-2020 LTI cycle.
ISS Recommendation	FOR . ISS did not comment on use of discretion on the STI or LTI programs. ISS looked favorably at the positive alignment of pay and performance. Quantitative tests yielded "Low Concern."
Glass-Lewis Recommendation	AGAINST. Unlike ISS, Glass Lewis identified concerns with the Company's weak disclosure of incentive goals and use of discretion. GL criticized the fact that the company did not disclose what results would have been if not for the use of discretion.

Case Study #2 - Retail



Fiscal Year	STI	LTI	ISS	Glass	SOP Vote
	Discretion	Discretion	Vote	Lewis Vote	Outcome
March 31	Yes	Yes	For	For	97%

Proxy Filed July 2020

Annual Incentive Program	Additional discretionary bonuses were paid to impacted NEOs in the amount equal to the difference between 1) 50% of the projected bonus achievement prior to COVID-19 and 2) the bonus earned. All bonus payments were deferred until such time the committee or board determines.
Long-Term Incentive Program	The number of performance shares vesting on June 1, 2020 were increased by the excess of the projected vested percentage over the actual vested percentage.
ISS Recommendation	FOR, <u>with caution</u> . ISS cited concerns on the limited disclosure around performance metric targets and actual performance for the STI and LTIP programs. However, the discretionary adjustments were modest and overall payouts in both programs were well-below target. Quantitative tests yielded "High Concern."
Glass-Lewis Recommendation	FOR . Glass Lewis noted that increases to STI and LTIP due to COVID-19 warranted scrutiny but acknowledge a reasonable level of disclosure and the extraordinary circumstances at the time of its FYE. No concerns were raised given the pay and performance alignment which resulted in a "C" grade.

Case Study #3 – Consumer Goods



Fiscal Year	STI	LTI	ISS	Glass	SOP Vote
	Discretion	Discretion	Vote	Lewis Vote	Outcome
May 31	Yes	Yes	Against	Against	54%

Proxy Filed July 2020

Annual Incentive Program	Annual bonus payout increased from 0% to 100% to approximate Adjusted EBIT performance during the first three quarters of fiscal 2020 (June 1, 2019 – February 29, 2020).
Long-Term Incentive Program	LTIP payout was increased from o% to 75% to approximate Adjusted Revenue and Adjusted EPS performance during the first eleven quarters of the period spanning fiscal 2018-2020. The 2020 – 2022 LTIP cycle is based solely on rTSR (previously based on revenues and EPS).
ISS Recommendation	AGAINST. ISS criticized that large discretionary bonuses were awarded when payouts were not earned under the 2020 STI and 2018-2020 LTI program without sufficient explanation. Quantitative tests yielded "Low Concern."
Glass-Lewis Recommendation	AGAINST. Glass Lewis cited the quantum of awards granted during the year and the continued use of one-off discretionary awards as areas of concern. Pay and performance test resulted in a "F" grade.

Key Takeaways



- Time to evaluate 2020 payouts
 - Many companies took "wait and see" approach
 - Many performed better than anticipated in 3Q and 4Q
- Don't decide in a vacuum 2020 decisions may impact 2021 target compensation and plan design
- Balance all stakeholders
 - Management, workforce, and shareholders
- Early disclosures demonstrate precedence, but not prevalence
 - Reflects decision-making tailored to individual facts and circumstances
 - Benchmarking will not be as helpful in decision making for 2021
- Prepare for direct shareholder engagement
 - Additional disclosure in proxy with committee's rationale for pay decisions and business challenges/successes through the pandemic
 - ISS and Glass Lewis expectations have not materially changed; while they may be more open minded in 2020, direct shareholder engagement will support a positive say-on-pay outcome





Questions



Join NACD and Pearl Meyer for our next Compensation Series webinar on January 28, 2021 at 2:00 PM (ET)

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